) and the present value of tax shields. Schauten and Tans (2006) show for the models used in Myers (1974) , Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985) , that the present value of tax shields is equal to the difference between the present value of the expected taxes paid by the unlevered firm and the levered firm, with each of the models' implied r g as discount rate. We discuss a numerical example using the valuation framework by Schauten and Tans (2006) and give a logic explanation for the low implied r g s of Miles and Ezzell's and Harris and Pringle's model. 
Introduction
This paper provides a numerical example of how to calculate the cost of capital of government 's claim (r g ) and the present value of tax shields. Schauten and Tans (2006) show for the models used in Myers (1974) , Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985) , that the present value of tax shields is equal to the difference between the present value of the expected taxes paid by the unlevered firm and the levered firm, with each of the models' implied r g as discount rate. We discuss a numerical example using the valuation framework by Schauten and Tans (2006) and give a logic explanation for the low implied r g s of Miles and Ezzell's and Harris and Pringle's model. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the valuation framework by Schauten and Tans (2006) and their derivation of a general formula for r g including a comparison of the implied r g s for the models used by Myers (1974), Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985) .
1 Section 3 contains the numerical example for a hypothetical firm.
Section 4 concludes.
Valuation framework
The total value of the firm (TV) is calculated on a beforetax basis and is equal to the sum of the present values of equity (E), debt (D) and government's claim (G). We assume TV does not depend on leverage. 2 This implies that the TV of an unlevered firm is equal to the TV of an (except for leverage) identical levered firm.
As shown in Table 1 , TV at t = 0 of the unlevered, as well as the levered firm, is equal to the present value of the expected OCFs, where the OCF at t = 1 is equal to the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) minus gZ 3 . We assume OCF is a growing perpetuity. The discount rate for both streams of cash flows is the same since the risk of the OCF of the unlevered firm and the levered firm is equal. 
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For the unlevered firm, E at t = 0 (E u ) is the present value of the expected ECFs. The ECF at t = 1 is EBIT after tax at t = 1 minus gZ. The discount rate for the ECFs is r u, the unlevered cost of equity. G u is the present value at t = 0 of the expected EBITs times the corporate tax rate τ. We assume the risk of the ECF for the unlevered firm is equal to the risk of the OCF, since the only risk for both streams is the business risk of the assets. This implies the same cost of capital for the claim of the government as well. TV of the unlevered firm at t = 0 is ❾ Equation (9) is the general formula for r g . 7 If debt is zero, then r g = r e = r u . If debt is higher than 0, we expect r g to be higher than r u . However, as will be shown in the next section, this is not always true.
To derive the implied r g s for the models used by Myers (1974) , Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985) we insert the equity functions as summarized in Table 2 into (9) 8 . The implied r g s for the models are given in Table 3 . If we insert the implied r g s from Table 3 into (6) we find for each of the models the PVTS as presented in Table 2 . and the cost of equity formulas for the models used by Myers (1974) , Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985) . V l is the value of a levered firm, V u is the value of an unlevered firm, PVTS is the present value of the tax shield, τ is the corporate tax rate, D is the value of debt, E is the value of equity, Miles and Ezzell (1980) Haris and Pringle (1985) If we compare the formulas in Table 3 Myers (1974) , Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985) . We derived r g by inserting the cost of equity functions from Table 2 into equation (9). r u is the cost of capital of an unlevered firm, r d is the cost of debt, D is the market value of debt, G l is the present value of the expected taxes levered firm, τ is the corporate tax rate and g the expected growth rate. Table 4 and Table 5 , respectively. The balance sheets at t = 0 and the profit and loss accounts at t = 1 are identical for both scenarios. However, the expected cash flows at t = 1, except for the government cash flow (GCF) 9 , differ because of the investments that have to be made at t = 1. Under the no growth scenario, the firm must invest to maintain its fixed assets at a level that enables it to ensure constant cash flows. Under this scenario, working capital remains constant. This implies that the yearly investment is equal to the depreciation of its fixed assets. Under the growth scenario, the firm has to invest more to achieve growth.
This extra investment at the end of year t equals 2.5% of the book value of its assets at the beginning of year t. The firm starts to invest in growth at t = 1. The dividend under each scenario is equal to ECF.
The cost of capital for the government, r g , is calculated as follows. First we calculate V l using the APV method with the formulas from column 2 of 
Summary
The total value of a firm comprises the present value of equity cash flows, debt cash flows and government cash flows. The value of the claim the government is equal to the present value of the expected tax payments, with its own discount rate r g . In this paper we discuss a numerical example of how to calculate the cost of capital of government's claim and the present value of tax shields. We show that for the models used in Myers (1974) , Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985) , the PVTS is equal to the difference between the present value of the expected taxes paid by the unlevered firm and the levered firm with each model's implied r g as discount rate. Given our valuation framework where we assume that r u is the discount for the pre-tax cash flow, we show in contrast to Myers' mode, low implied rgs for both Miles and Ezzell's model and Harris and Pringle's model. This result is a logic consequence of the assumption we made about the risk of the pre-tax cash flow.
Appendix: The implied cost of capital of government's claim and the present value of tax shields: A numerical example The implied cost of capital of government's claim and the present value of tax shields: A numerical example 
